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BEYOND THE COURTS, BEYOND THE STATE: REFLECTIONS ON




It is uncommon for law journal articles to be reported in The New
York Times, but in February 2012 the venerable newspaper carried a
headline that would raise the eyebrows of many: "'We the People' Los-
es Appeal with People Around the World."i Referring to an empirical
study by David S. Law and Mila Versteeg2 tracing the declining influ-
ence of the U.S. Constitution around the world, the authors conclude, as
reported in The New York Times, that "[a]mong the world's democra-
cies, constitutional similarity to the United States has clearly gone into
free fall. Over the 1960s and 1970s, democratic constitutions as a
whole become more similar to the U.S. Constitution, only to reverse
course in the 1980s and 1990s."3 For many non-lawyers, and perhaps
even for lawyers outside the field of comparative constitutional law,
the declining influence of the U.S. Constitution is likely to come as a
surprise. After all, our modern world still owes much to the United
States and its vision of constitutional government; indeed, modern
constitutionalism itself can be traced to the tumultuous end of the
eighteenth century and the break by the United States from the more
traditional and hierarchical forms of government across the Atlantic.4
*Associate Professor Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore. I am grateful to Ernest
Caldwell, Arif Jamal, Terry Nardin, A.P. Simester, and the students in the Graduate Research
Seminar at the NUS Faculty of Law for a stimulating discussion of an earlier version of this paper.
1. Adam Liptak, 'We the People' Loses Appeal with People Around the World, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/07/us/we-the-people-loses-appeal-with-people-
around-the-world.html.
2. David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution, 87
N.Y.U. L. REV. 762 (2012).
3. Liptak, supra note 1. In the words of Law and Versteeg, whether "the analysis is global in
scope or focuses more specifically upon countries that share historical, legal, political, or geo-
graphic ties to the United States, the conclusion remains the same: The U.S. Constitution has
become an increasingly unpopular model for constitutional framers elsewhere." Law & Versteeg,
supra note 2, at 769.
4. The American and French Revolutions offered a new understanding of constitutionalism
because they sought to regulate public power comprehensively through law: see Dieter Grimm,
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But today, as the political, economic, and legal influence of the
United States stands in question and Europe's economy looks bleak, it
remains to be seen whether China's economic successes will be cou-
pled with a legal ascendance. On some measures, this seems unlikely.
China's Supreme People's Court shows few signs of taking up the cause
of judicial constitutional review. By that measure, China is unlikely to
find itself among the world's constitutional leaders. But if Ernest Cald-
well is right, those looking for an emerging constitutional culture in
China have been looking in the wrong place.s The real action in consti-
tutional law in China is not in the higher courts, but in the lower courts
that settle day-to-day disputes, and the constitutional discourse in
those courts is not about limiting state power, but about the need for
"horizontal" protections of citizens-specifically laborers-from their
powerful employers in furtherance of constitutional values such as
social justice.6 Caldwell finds in these examples confirmation that the
American constitutional paradigm-particularly the "influence of up-
per-level court decisions and the ideology of judicial review"7-is un-
helpful in other constitutional contexts, such as China's, where a focus
on socio-economic rights is "important for understanding alternative
avenues of constitutional development."8
Besides providing an important perspective on constitutionalism
in China, Caldwell makes a crucial point about the methodology of
comparative constitutional law. We cannot assume that the methods
and models of constitutional analysis that might be appropriate in one
jurisdiction (e.g., the United States of America) will be equally relevant
in understanding another (e.g., the People's Republic of China).9 Yet
Caldwell's approach raises other methodological questions and invites
new approaches to constitutional thinking. First, while acknowledging
and drawing on other constitutional traditions in Western liberal de-
mocracies (such as Germany) to illustrate the significance of "horizon-
tal rights" in constitutional thought, Caldwell nevertheless concludes
that China's approach to rights is distinct from the Western tradition,
glossing over important differences within Western constitutional
The Achievement of Constitutionalism and Its Prospects in a Changed World, in THE TWILIGHT OF
CONSTITUTIONALIsM? 3, 11 (Petra Dobner & Martin Loughlin eds., 2010).
5. Ernest Caldwell, Horizontal Rights and Chinese Constitutionalism: Judicialization through
Labor Disputes, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 63 (2012).
6. Id. at 63.
7. Id. at 89.
8. Id. at 91.
9. Id. at 67-68.
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thought. Second, while criticizing a single-minded focus on the deci-
sions of the higher courts, Caldwell's approach remains largely court-
centric; it does not acknowledge other understandings of constitution-
alism, whether in U.S. constitutional scholarship or in the varying prac-
tices of constitutionalism in contemporary East and Southeast Asia.
Finally, the observation that constitutional principles can play an im-
portant role in moderating private power in an age of multinational
enterprises can be extended beyond jurisdictional boundaries. If pri-
vate and hybrid (public-private) forms of power are increasingly op-
erating beyond states, we need to find innovative ways of moderating
power that stretch our contemporary understandings of constitutional
law.
1. HORIZONTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
In some ways, Caldwell's critique is less a critique of "Western"
constitutionalism generally than it is a critique of the projection of U.S.
constitutional theories and methods onto other constitutional orders.
But the scope of his critique is not always clear. Although he rejects
what he regards as traditional American approaches to constitutional-
ism and demonstrates an awareness of other constitutional traditions,
such as the German and European human rights traditions that protect
horizontal rights of the sort Caldwell identifies in China, he also, at
times, objects more generally to the "rights discourse of Euro-
American constitutionalism" and to "non-Anglo-American[] tech-
niques of constitutional engagement"lo with their narrow focus "on
state-citizen conflict as an indicator of constitutional engagement."i1
Caldwell acknowledges that the idea of the "indirect effect" (i.e.,
that constitutional principles shape the law governing private disputes,
rather than controlling the private litigants themselves) can be found
in German constitutional law and in the jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights, demonstrating an "evolving concept of an indi-
vidual right that is no longer understood as merely a defensive meas-
ure of individual protection, but [is] also considered a positive right
that imposes a duty on the state to enforce it."12 Even so, Caldwell con-
cludes: "[u]nfortunately, despite these examples, the 'vertical' rights
orientation continues to dominate both rights-based and constitutional
10. Id. at 63-64.
11. Id at 74.
12. Id at 77.
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discourse in comparative law, particularly when discussing domestic
constitutional development."13
It is uncontroversial to say that modern constitutional thought in
liberal constitutional democracies has historically focused on the limi-
tation and regulation of state power,14 but recent developments in
Europe, South Africa, and elsewhere suggest a conceptual and norma-
tive broadening. For example, the indirect application of constitutional
rights to private litigants is apparent in the South African Constitution.
Section 8(2) expressly provides that a provision in the Bill of Rights
"binds a natural or juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is appli-
cable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any
duty imposed by the right."is Section 8(3), in turn, directs a court to
apply a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person if
necessary to develop "the common law to the extent that legislation
does not give effect to that right."16 It also permits the court "to devel-
op rules of the common law to limit the right," provided that the limit
is consistent with the general limitation clause in section 36(1) of the
constitution.17 While the South African Constitution seeks to address
the question of applicability of constitutional rights to private actors
expressly, in other jurisdictions this issue has been addressed primari-
ly through judicial interpretation.18 The real question, it seems, is not
whether constitutions govern private legal relations at all, but how and
to what extent they do so. According to Cheryl Saunders in her survey
of Canada, South Africa, and Australia, in a common law legal system,
constitutional rights might influence private legal relations in four
ways: they
may directly affect the rights and obligations of parties under the
common law; they may override the common law through a state ac-
tion doctrine, treating the courts as emanations of the state; they
13. Id at 78.
14. Grimm, supra note 4, at 11 (noting the correlation between the consolidation of public
power in the state and the rise of modern constitutionalism).
15. s. AFR. CONST., Ch. 2 § 8(2), 1996.
16. Id.
17. Id. Additionally, Section 9 of the Constitution prohibits discrimination by the state, di-
rectly or indirectly, on grounds that include "race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or
social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, lan-
guage and birth." But is also provides that no person "may unfairly discriminate directly or indi-
rectly against anyone" on these grounds and that national legislation "must be enacted to prevent
or prohibit unfair discrimination." So, at least in the context of discrimination, South Africa's
constitution has a direct impact on the conduct of private actors. S. AFR. CONsT., Ch. 2 § 9(3)-(4),
1996.
18. See generally Mark Tushnet, The Issue of State Action/Horizontal Effect in Comparative
Constitutional Law, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L. 79 (2003).
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may indirectly influence the common law, under authority of the
constitution; they may be used as a source on which courts draw in
the parallel development of the common law.19
These examples suggest that Caldwell's claim that the "vertical"
rights orientation remains dominant does not tell the whole story of
constitutional development in the broadly "Western"2o tradition. It
may be that Caldwell has the U.S. experience particularly in mind, and
in this respect, he may well be correct; in some jurisdictions, it may be
more difficult than in others to make a case for the horizontal applica-
tion of constitutional rights, for both structural and ideological rea-
sonS.21 But to suggest that Western (or Western-inspired) comparative
constitutional methodology focuses too narrowly "on state-citizen
conflict as an indicator of constitutional engagement"22 is something of
an overstatement. At a time when "post-modern governments" are
increasingly "export[ing] ... functions to private actors which were
traditionally considered attributes of sovereignty, or at least were per-
ceived as integral parts of the operation of a legitimate government,"23
horizontal rights are increasingly relevant to the aspiration of moder-
ating power through law.
II. CONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND THE COURTS
Caldwell is right to be wary of equating constitutionalism with the
decisions of high courts, a view that resonates with the efforts of some
constitutional scholars in the United States, notably Mark Tushnet, to
draw attention away from the courts and toward an articulation of a
social or political understanding of constitutionalism.24 Although
Tushnet's views on constitutionalism might not seem part of the main-
stream of American constitutional thinking, a substantial body of liter-
ature on constitutionalism looks beyond decisions of the U.S. Supreme
19. Cheryl Saunders, Constitutional Rights and the Common Law, in THE CONSTITUTION IN
PRIVATE RELATIONS: EXPANDING CONSTITUTIONALISM 183, 213 (AndrAs Saj6 & RenAta Uitz eds., 2005).
20. Caldwell himself does not use "Western," preferring variously "Anglo-American," "Euro-
American," or "North Atlantic" constitutionalism. Caldwell, supra note 5, at 59, 60 n.2, 69.
21. Tushnet, supra note 18, at 84-85, 88 (the relative ease with which a constitution can
protect rights "horizontally" depends on both structural constitutional features, such as whether
the ordinary courts or a specialized constitutional court decides constitutional questions in pri-
vate litigation, and ideological commitments, including the degree of commitment to social demo-
cratic values).
22. Caldwell, supra note 5, at 74.
23. Ren~ta Uitz, Yet Another Revival of Horizontal Effect of Constitutional Rights: Why? And
Why Now?-An Introduction, in THE CONSTITUTION IN PRIVATE RELATIONS: EXPANDING
CONSTITUTIONALISM 1, 13 (AndrAs Saj6 & Ren~ta Uitz, eds., 2005).
24. MARK TuSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
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Court, seeking instead to understand constitutionalism from an extrin-
sic, contextual perspective, exposing its historically and politically con-
tingent qualities.25 From this perspective, Caldwell's investigation of
constitutional discourse in the lower courts, while helpfully showing
the limits of a single-minded focus on the higher courts, is still trapped
in a court-centric paradigm of law, including constitutional law.
What the experience of constitutionalism in China and other parts
of Asia (and possibly elsewhere, including the United Kingdom) reveals
is that constitutionalism can be understood in ways that are radically
different from the orthodox American constitutional perspective,
which locates constitutionalism in the courts and, in particular, in the
Supreme Court. Consider, for instance, the experience of Thailand,
which since 1932, amid intermittent political instability, upheavals,
and military coups, has had eighteen distinct formal constitutions.26 A
formal and cynical interpretation of these facts might conclude that
Thailand effectively has no constitution, in the sense of rules or princi-
ples that constrain or moderate political power. But commentators on
Thailand, both within and outside it, suggest that Thailand's "real" con-
stitution is found, not in formal documents, but in the understandings,
practices, and principles that guide and constrain Thai politiCS.27 These
are principles that operate informally, in the sense that they may not
be visible to a formal analysis of a written constitution or the decisions
of Thailand's Constitutional Court.
Singapore's constitution is equally complex. Once again, a formal
analysis of Singapore's constitution and its judicial practice suggests a
thin constitutional practice, with minimal intervention by the courts on
constitutional grounds. But the practice of constitutionalism in Singa-
pore might be seen as more nuanced and less susceptible to formal
analytical tools and conceptS.28 As Li-ann Thio has argued, courts in
non-liberal constitutional democracies "play a marginal role in consti-
25. See e.g., CONSTITUTIONALISM, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND LEGITIMACY (Michael Rosenfeld, ed.,
1994); THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, eds., 2009).
26.ANDREW HARDING & PETER LEYLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM OF THAILAND: A CONTEXTUAL
ANALYSIS 2 (2011).
27. Nidhi Eoseewong, The Thai Cultural Constitution, 3 KYOTo REV. OF SOUTHEAST ASIA 3-4
(Chris Baker trans., 2003), available at:
http://kyotoreview.cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp/issue/issue2/article-243.html (this article first appeared
as Rattthamanun Chabap Watthanatham Thai, SINLAPA WATTHANATHAM 11 (1991)). See also Tom
Ginsburg, Constitutional Afterlife: The Continuing Impact of Thailand's Postpolitical Constitution, 7
INT'L J. OF CONST. L. 83, 87-88 (2009).
28. See Li-ann Thio, Soft Constitutional Law in Non-Liberal Asian Constitutional Democracies,
8 INT'L J. OF CONST. L. 766 (2010).
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tutional politics"29 and soft constitutional law-understood as "delib-
erately created, constitutionally significant norms that are not legally
binding but have some legal effect in ordering constitutional relation-
ships"30-is much more significant. Thio proceeds to show how Singa-
pore has used soft constitutional law tools, such as government white
papers and non-binding declarations, to address problems as diverse
as religious harmony and the scope of the president's powers.31
These examples of constitutionalism beyond the courts are not
limited to Asia. For instance, while the United Kingdom has recently
moved toward a court-centered constitutional practice since the Hu-
man Rights Act of 1998 entered into force, the U.K.'s constitutional
history reveals a much more sophisticated political constitutional prac-
tice32 in which mechanisms of political accountability have developed
to limit the powers of government beyond the formal sphere of the
courts.33 So, according to Adam Tomkins, we should not assume "that
no constitutional problem is solved unless ... it is judicially solved, and
that there is no constitutional problem that cannot be . .. solved by the
judiciary."34 Whether the United Kingdom will gradually shift toward
"legal constitutionalism" in which the courts play a much greater role
in constraining the government, and whether the political mechanisms
of accountability will be relegated to a secondary status remains to be
seen. But the crucial point here is that constitutional practices beyond
the courts are not exceptional, whether in Asia or in at least some of
the jurisdictions in the liberal-democratic West.
Returning to the United States, it is unlikely that U.S. constitution-
alism is, in this respect, exceptional. Is constitutional practice in the
United States that much more formal or court-centered than it is else-
where? On the one hand, one of the hallmarks of Western "patterns of
law" is its professional dimension; as Ugo Mattei has argued, the West-
ern legal tradition is characterized both by "the separation between
law and politics and the separation between law and religious and/or
philosophical tradition," the former of which "consist[s] of the adop-
tion of public decisions based not on politics but on technical and legal
29. Id. at 776.
30. Id. at 768.
31. See id, at 785, 793.
32. ADAM TOMKINS, PUBLIC LAW 18 (2003) (Under a political constitution, "those who exercise
political power (let us say the government) are held to constitutional account through political
means, and through political institutions (for example, Parliament)").




merits as interpreted by a professional legal culture."35 On the other
hand, the idea that constitutionalism has a profound informal, extra-
judicial dimension has a long (if less visible) pedigree in U.S. constitu-
tional thought, well before its recent revival.36 Some eighty years ago,
for instance, Karl Llewellyn observed that a living constitution is not
merely a set of rules; rather, it is an institution, which is "in [the] first
instance a set of ways of living and doing."37 A living, "working" consti-
tution, then, consists of more than the formal text and the decisions of
the Supreme Court; rather, "a firmly established constitu-
tion ... involves ways of behavior deeply set and settled in the make-
up of [the] people-and it involves not patterns of doing (or of inhibi-
tion) merely, but also accompanying patterns of thinking and of emo-
tion."38 Caldwell's plea to shift scholarly analysis of China's
constitution away from a singular focus on the highest courts marks a
step away from the formal view Llewellyn criticizes. But a full picture
of constitutionalism in China, as elsewhere, must be much wider in
scope than Caldwell's court-centric methodology permits.
Ill. CONSTITUTIONALISM AND PRIVATE POWER BEYOND THE STATE
Caldwell's analysis helpfully suggests that domestic constitutional
practice ought to be regarded as more about restraining private power
than it is about protecting individuals from state power. He frames this
point in terms of China's constitutional commitment to a "socialist ide-
ology"39 as reflected in the socio-economic rights set out in the consti-
tution. The judiciary, he argues, can make a decision based on the
constitution and "can do so by portraying their act as one of promoting
socialism and providing justice for the citizens caught in the grasp of
the private sector."40
It is important to recognize that constitutional law can play a role
in moderating private power, but this role need not be limited to "so-
cialist" constitutions or to China's particular situation. The crucial
35. Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World's Legal Systems, 45
AM. J. OF COMP. L. 5, 23 (1997).
36. See Tushnet, supra note 18; Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution,
117 YALE L.J. 408, 408 (2007) (arguing that, properly understood, "'[T]he Constitu-
tion'... include[s] not only the canonical document but also a variety of statutes, executive mate-
rials, and practices that structure [the U.S.] government").
37. Karl Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 17 (1934).
38. Id. at 18.
39. Caldwell, supra note 5, at 91.
40. Id.
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point-and the one that resonates even more widely in an era domi-
nated by multinational enterprises and the rise and resurgence of pri-
vate power (and its hybrid variations) that operate within and beyond
the state-is that the moderation or restraint of state power ought no
longer to be the singular concern of constitutional law. Indeed, Cald-
well's suggestion that socio-economic rights are important "for under-
standing alternative avenues of constitutional development"41 can be
applied to constitutional practice more widely and hints at a broader
prescription for constitutionalism in the decades ahead. There are two
points here. The first is that even in the United States in the wake of the
2008 financial crisis, the role of government in constraining private
power, however contested, is shifting. Although it will likely take time
for judicial doctrine on financial regulation to "work[] itself pure,"42
the involvement of the U.S. government in regulating the financial sec-
tor in the wake of the crisis-described in one account as "a creeping
nationalisation of the financial services sector"-has been extensive
and unprecedented,43 suggesting that the "popular" constitution is
generally more tolerant of "crisis" intervention to restore the econo-
my.44 But whatever the case might be domestically, it is increasingly
apparent-and this is the second point-that threats to individual and
communal well-being come not only or primarily from the state, but
from multiple forms and shades of private power and the projection of
that power around the globe.
While the nineteenth century witnessed the demise of the compa-
ny-state in British India in favor of the Crown as political sovereign,
and with it, the temporary demise of transnational private power in
favor of state power, late twentieth century globalization saw the re-
turn of transnational private power. In the second edition of his book
on the regulation of multinational enterprises, published in 2007, Peter
Muchlinski acknowledges the increasing limitations of a state-centric
approach to regulation:
[A] developed understanding of the regulation of MNEs requires a
further dimension. This stems from the interaction of MNEs with the
political communities in which they operate. In the first edition of
41. Id.
42. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 407 (1986).
43. Jose Bermudez & Eduardo Vidal, Restructuring US financial institutions: Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, Lehman Brothers and AIG, in GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: NAVIGATING AND UNDERSTANDING
THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY ASPECTS 13, 28 (Eugenio A Bruno, ed., 2009).
44. See generally Richard C. Schragger, Democracy and Debt, 121 YALE L.J. 860 (2012) (argu-




this book [in 1995] these were identified simply as nation states,
given their role as the main source of formal legal regulation. A state-
centric approach is no longer adequate for two reasons. First, it fails
to reflect the full range of regulatory actions and responsibilities to
which MNEs may be subject, or indeed voluntarily undertake, in a
complex globalizing environment... Secondly, it does not allow an
adequate examination of the full range of parties that may seek to
exert regulatory influence upon these firms.45
If multinational enterprises are no longer within the direct or ex-
clusive regulatory control of states;46 if states are again47 patrons of
multinational enterprises on "a scale and with... sophisticated tools"
never seen before;48 if those enterprises increasingly favor private
forms of adjudication (such as international commercial arbitration)
over litigation in state courts;49 and if non-governmental organizations
now have a greater impact on the conduct of international business,so
including, for instance, the labor standards in the supply chain of mul-
tinational corporationssi in factories around the world, including in
China-then our assumptions about the adequacy of formal con-
straints that states purport to impose on power, public or private, must
be fundamentally re-examined. A re-examination of this nature re-
quires new ways of thinking about constitutionalism both within and
beyond52 the state, and innovative ways of imposing "horizontal" con-
45. PETER T. MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAw 81 (2d ed. 2007).
46. See id.
47. We find ourselves, once again, confronted by the challenges of the "company-state" that
confronted law and policy-makers in the eighteenth and nineteen centuries. See PHILIP J. STERN,
THE COMPANY-STATE: CORPORATE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE EARLY MODERN FOUNDATIONS OF THE BRITISH
EMPIRE IN INDIA 3 (2011) (describing the eighteenth century as "an early modern world filled with
a variety of corporate bodies politic and hyphenated, hybrid, overlapping and composite forms of
sovereignty").
48. Adrian Wooldridge, The Visible Hand, THE ECONOMIST, January 21-27, 2012, at 55, 57.
49. Duncan McKenzie, Dispute Resolution in London and the UK2010, THECITYUK (September
20, 2010), available at http://www.thecityuk.com/assets/Uploads/Dispute-resolution-2010.pdf
(noting that "resolution of disputes [in the United Kingdom] mainly involving international par-
ties rose by 59% to 5,297 in 2009 from 3,339 disputes in 2007").
50. See generally, HANDBOOK OF TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: INSTITUTIONS AND INNOVATIONS
(Thomas Hale & David Held, eds., 2011) (for a survey of many of these organizations and their
impact on international business).
51. According to the Fair Labor Association website, before Apple Inc. joined the FLA in
2012, "FLA worked with Apple to assess the impact of Apple's training programs which help raise
awareness of labor rights and standards among workers in its supply chain. Like all new affiliates,
Apple will align its compliance program with FLA obligations within the next two years." See
Applejoins FLA, FAIR LABOR ASS'N (January 13, 2012), http://www.fairlabor.org/blog/entry/apple-
joins-fla.
52. See Gunter Teubner, Fragmented Foundations: Societal Constitutionalism Beyond the
Nation State, in THE TWILIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM? 327-41 (Petra Dobner and Martin Loughlin,
eds., 2010).
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straints on supra-national forms of power. Particularly for domestic
constitutional thinking, there is much work to be done.
IV. CONSTITUTIONALISM UNBOUNDED
Mainstream constitutional thought, particularly as expounded in
Western legal scholarship, has long been tethered to two fundamental
ideas that have, in turn, influenced the methodology of comparative
constitutional law. The first is the idea that constitutionalism resides
first and foremost in the courts, suggesting an analytic bias in favor of
comparative judicial review. The second is the notion that constitu-
tionalism is tightly bound to the state. Caldwell's examination of Chi-
nese constitutionalism invites us to explore new ways of thinking
about constitutionalism beyond the liberal democracies of the West,
while simultaneously demonstrating the powerful hold of traditional
constitutional methods on our imagination. As political and economic
power continue to shift East and South while escaping the jurisdiction-
al confines of the modern state, new ways of thinking about constitu-
tionalism become imperative.
This is not to say that judicial review is irrelevant. There is little
doubt that courts are important to constitutionalism, however much
that importance may vary from one jurisdiction to another. But what-
ever our conception of constitutionalism, it must, to be effective, infuse
the society and all those subject to it: "I often wonder," declared
Learned Hand at a ceremony in Central Park in the spring of 1944,
whether we do not rest our hopes too much upon constitutions, up-
on laws and upon courts. These are false hopes; believe me, these
are false hopes. Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it
dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it; no constitu-
tion, no law, no court can even do much to help it.53
Wherever we seek to moderate power through law-whether in
wartime America, contemporary China, the newly reconfigured consti-
tutional regimes of some Arab states, or an emerging global "societal"54
constitution-fundamental constitutional values must have a solid,
social foundation. And in this respect, if no other, the deeper sociologi-
cal aspirations of American constitutionalism captured so eloquently
by Learned Hand remain alive and well around the world.
53. Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF
LEARNED HAND 143,144 (Irving Dillard, ed, 1959).
54. Teubner,supro note 52.
2012]1 103

